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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-4212
________________
TONY GILLESPIE,
Appellant
v.
MR. HOGAN; DENTIST CHRISTOPHER PALUCH,
YORK COUNTY JAIL
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-01033)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
_______________________________________

Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
March 23, 2006
Before: ROTH, FUENTES AND VANANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 31, 2006)

_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM

Tony Gillespie appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. We will dismiss the appeal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B).
I.
According to Gillespie’s complaint, between November 2000 and November 2001
Gillespie was confined at York County Jail. During that time, the dentist at the jail,
Christopher Paluch, removed one of Gillespie’s teeth. He was subsequently transferred
to SCI-Mahanoy, where he experienced “major” pain in his gums and mouth and sought
out dental care several times. Gillespie underwent oral surgery to remove a fragment of
decayed tooth and was informed by the SCI-Mahanoy dentist that, during the earlier
procedure, Paluch had neglected to fully remove Gillespie’s decaying tooth, part of
which had remained under his gum line for over a year. Gillespie also alleges that Paluch
never inquired about his pre-existing health problems, and that as a diabetic he has never
fully healed from the oral surgeries.
In his initial complaint, Gillespie did not identify the jail dentist, who was merely
referred to as “John Doe.” The District Court partially granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, leaving only the John Doe dentist as a defendant. On February 26, 2004,
Gillespie identified the dentist as Christopher Paluch, D.M.D., and the Court
subsequently ordered process to issue. Paluch filed a motion to dismiss claiming, inter
alia, that Gillespie’s suit with regard to him was time-barred because he was not named
as a defendant until nearly three years after Gillespie’s March 6, 2001, tooth extraction –
well beyond the two-year statute of limitations.
The Magistrate Judge agreed and Gillespie objected, claiming that the discovery

rule dictated that the limitation period began to run no sooner than April 25, 2002, the
date he learned of Paluch’s mistake from the SCI-Mahanoy dentist. The District Court
adopted Gillespie’s discovery rule analysis, but rejected his proposed date, finding that
because Gillespie was experiencing pain in his gums and mouth when he arrived at SCIMahanoy (likely sometime in November 2001), the statute of limitations began to run
well before April 25, 2002. Gillespie appealed the District Court’s dismissal.
II.
When reviewing the District Court’s grant of motion to dismiss, we must accept as
true all factual allegations in the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from them. See Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988). With
regard to the statute of limitations, only where “the facts are so clear that reasonable
minds cannot differ” may “the commencement period . . . be determined as a matter of
law.” Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 129 (citation omitted).
Applying that standard, we are reluctant to conclude that Gillespie had
experienced mouth pain by February 26, 2002 (two years before February 26, 2004, the
date Gillespie named Paluch as a defendant adjusting for the prison mailbox rule). We
need not resolve that question here, however, because Gillespie’s complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Gillespie
must show that the Paluch was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. See
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Allegations of negligent treatment are medical
malpractice claims, not constitutional violation claims. Id. at 105-06.

Though Gillespie has clearly endured significant hardship, his allegations do not
amount to deliberate indifference concerning his tooth extraction. See Isenberg v. Prasse,
433 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1970) (rejecting claim that malpractice by dentist while extracting
teeth constitutes unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment). The same is true with
regard to Paluch’s failure to ascertain Gillespie’s status as a diabetic: a physician’s
failure to review or take a patient’s medical history may be negligence, but it is not
deliberate indifference. See Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 525 (9th
Cir. 1999); Steward v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1999); Williams v. O’Leary,
55 F.3d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 1995); Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 155 (6th Cir. 1995).
Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

